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Banning Islamic Veils – Is Gender Equality a Valid Argument? 
Erica Howard, Middlesex University 
Abstract:  
Bans on the wearing of Islamic head scarves and veils are often said to be 
necessary for the promotion of gender equality. In this article, I argue that this is 
based on a stereotypical view of Islam and of Muslim women which ignores the 
many different reasons why women wear headscarves and veils. I also argue that 
bans are unnecessary and even counterproductive to achieving gender equality. 
For those women who wear these garments because they freely choose to do so, 
bans are not necessary to promote their equality. And, for those women who are 
pressured into wearing headscarves or veils, bans could well work against 
promoting their equality, because they could prevent them from getting an 
education and a job and could lead to their isolation from society.. 
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In many European countries, extensive debates are taking place about the wearing 
of religious symbols in public places and whether there is a need for legislative 
bans against this. Especially the wearing of headscarves or hijabs and face 
coverings, like the niqab and the burqa,1 by Muslim women and girls appears to 
be the focus of many of these debates and of the bans in place at present. In 
France, for example, government employees, including teachers in state schools, 
are not allowed to wear any type of religious symbol at work. France has also, in 
2004, adopted a law in relation to primary and secondary schools which prohibits 
the wearing of ostentatious signs or dress by which pupils openly manifest a 
religious affiliation. The Islamic headscarf is usually seen as an ostentatious sign. 
And the French ban on the wearing of garments covering the face in public places 
came into force on 11 April 2011. The Bill proposing this ban passed in both 
lower and upper house of the French Parliament with overwhelming majority 
(French Parliament 2010 and French Senate 2010) and was declared constitutional 
by the Conseil Constitutionel (2010; Mahony 2010). 
                                                 
1 The hijab is a scarf that covers the hair and neck, but leaves the face free. The niqab is a veil that 
covers the head and face with the exception of the eyes. The burqa is a loose robe that covers the 
female from head to toe with the exception of the hands and with gauze covering or a slit for the 
eyes. There are a number of variations on these three with different names, which will be 
explained where used. 
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 In Germany, after the Federal Constitutional Court had held that States 
could ban teachers from wearing hijabs as long as this ban was laid down in laws 
which complied with the German constitution,2 half of the States have indeed 
enacted such laws. Some German States are now also planning to ban civil 
servants from wearing the burqa (Impey and Mara 2011). 
In Belgium, the law of 1 June 2011 bans the wearing of clothing that 
covers or conceals the face in whole or in part in public places. However, even 
before this law was adopted, local police regulations in a large number of 
municipalities already contained similar prohibitions (Vrielink et al. 2011). 
 In the Netherlands, the cabinet voted for a legal ban on the wearing of face 
covering clothing at the end of January 2012, but it is not clear whether this ban 
will become law as the Dutch Government has fallen and new elections will take 
place in September 2012 (DutchNews.nl 2012). And, in Spain (Johnson 2010), 
Italy, and Austria (Dahmann 2010), bills on the wearing of the full face veil or 
face covering clothing are also being discussed, while a majority of the population 
in Britain (Henessy 2010; Collins 2011) Denmark and Switzerland (Dahmann 
2010) support a ban, although there do not appear to be any immediate 
government plans for legislation in these countries. 
Although the laws in France and Belgium and the proposed Bill in the 
Netherlands ban all face covering clothing, the bans are specifically aimed at the 
                                                 
2 Ludin v Baden-Württemberg Federal Constitutional Court, Germany (BVerfG), 24 September 
2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 NJW 56 (2003), 3111. 
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wearing of Muslim face-covering veils. This is clear from the fact that, in the 
parliamentary and wider debates, one of the recurring arguments for imposing a 
legal ban is that this is necessary to promote equality between women and men 
and to fight the oppression of (Muslim) women who are made to wear religious 
head or face coverings by men. The burqa, hijab and niqab are seen as symbols of 
the oppression of women and as going against a woman’s fundamental rights and 
freedoms.3 This argument that (Islamic) veils go against equality of the sexes and, 
thus, against one of the fundamental values of Western states, is probably the 
most widely used to defend bans on hijabs, burqas and/or niqabs. It is also an 
argument used by many feminists, who are in favour of bans as they consider 
these necessary to emancipate Muslim women and girls.  
In this article, I first analyse the above argument in depth, looking at 
examples where it has been used in debates and case law in Europe. This is 
followed by a number of counter arguments which can be brought forward and 
which show that bans can also be opposed from a gender equality point of view. I 
conclude that legal bans on the wearing of Muslim religious clothing are 
unnecessary and could even be counterproductive to the promotion of equality 
between women and men and to the emancipation of Muslim women and girls. 
The meaning of the headscarf; the stereotypes which lay behind the arguments; 
                                                 
3 This is only one of a number of arguments used in favour of bans. For an analysis of the 
arguments in favour of bans and the counter arguments which can be brought forward against 
these, see Howard 2012. This article focusses on the gender equality argument only. 
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the ambivalence of feminists on this subject; and, the accusation of paternalism 
levelled at Islam all form part of the discussion. 
Bans are Necessary to Promote Gender Equality 
The wearing of Islamic clothing and veils is considered to be a symbol of the 
oppression of the women and girls who wear these, because, it is asserted, they 
are imposed on them by men, be it spouses, family, communities, religious leaders 
or the state (McGoldrick 2006, 13-5). The wearing of the veil is thus seen by 
many as an infringement of a woman’s right to equality with men. This is because 
Islam is perceived as a paternalistic religion which holds that women are inferior 
to men. This is the reason, this argument concludes, why (face-covering) veils 
need to be banned by law. 
The argument is clearly discernable in the debates in France. In March 
2010, the Conseil d’Etat brought out a ‘study of possible grounds for banning the 
full veil’ in which it stated that the full veil “testifies to a profoundly inegalitarian 
conception of the relationship between men and women” (Conseil d’Etat 2010, 8). 
And, French President Sarkozy called the niqab ‘a sign of debasement and 
subservience’, while another minister called it a male-imposed prison (Gilligan 
2011).  
In the Belgian parliamentary debates on the law banning face-covering 
clothing in public, many members saw face-veils as a violation of the dignity and 
humanity of women and this was based on the assumption that women who wear 
face-covering veils are (mostly or always) pressured into doing so (Vrielink et al. 
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2011, 631; DCO 2011, 5, 7, 10, 14). The term ‘prison’ or ‘mobile prison’ was also 
used in relation to the burqa (Vrienlink et al. ibid.; DCO 2011, 9, 10, 14).  
 In the Netherlands, the Government stated that having to wear a burqa or 
niqab in public was contrary to the equality between men and women and that, 
through the law, the Government was helping these women by taking away a 
barrier to their participation in society (Rijksoverheid 2012). And, in the debates 
in Spain, the burqa was said to be ‘degrading to women’ and ‘hardly compatible 
with human dignity’ (Johnson 2010). 
The argument is thus often couched in the language of protecting the 
fundamental human rights and dignity of women and protecting women against 
dehumanisation. In the Belgian Parliamentary debates, it was said that the sexual 
morality behind the burqa teaches that every woman who isn’t covered up is fair 
game for all men. The wearing of the face covering veil symbolises the oppressed, 
voiceless and passive status of women. Therefore, the ban will promote the 
emancipation of women (DCO 2011, 6). 
The Stasi Commission,4 set up in 2003 to study the implementation of the 
principle of secularism in France, states that the headscarf proves that young girls 
are being blamed for attracting male desire (Commission de Reflexion 2003, 57) 
and, that non-complying girls are stigmatised as prostitutes and infidels (ibid.). 
This means that women who do not cover up are being blamed for attracting male 
                                                 
4 This Commission was named after its chair, Bernhard Stasi. It recommended a 




desires and possible sexual abuse, which is a seen as an opinion which does not fit 
in modern times and this is thus another reason to ban such garments.   
The argument that face covering veils need to be banned to preserve 
dignity and rights not only concerns the dignity and rights of the women who 
wear the face veil. This public manifestation of inequality between men and 
women is, as Mullally (2011, 39) writes for France, seen as ‘damaging, not only 
to the dignity of the veiled woman, but to those who share public spaces with her’. 
A similar argument can be found in the Parliamentary debates in Belgium, where 
the face covering veil is seen as a symbol of the oppression of women and as such 
an offence to  the dignity of all women (Vrielink et al. 2011, 631).   
The argument that bans are necessary to promote gender equality can be 
heard in debates about banning headscarves as well, as will be clear from Loenen 
(2009, 315) where she writes: ‘a major argument put forward to ban headscarves 
in public schools derives from the idea that the headscarf is symbolic of the 
inferior position of women in Islam and that many girls and women are pressured 
into wearing it’.  
The same argument in relation to the wearing of headscarves was also 
used by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which oversees the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) of 1950. In Dahlab v Switzerland, a primary schoolteacher lost 
her job because she refused to remove her hijab. The ECtHR held that the wearing 
of the headscarf was hard to square with, among others, the principle of gender 
8 
 
equality.5 In Sahin v Turkey, where a female Muslim student was refused access 
to the exams for her medical degree at the University of Istanbul because she was 
wearing a hijab, the ECtHR held that the ban on the wearing of the Muslim 
headscarf at universities in Turkey served the legitimate purpose of promoting 
gender equality, among other purposes.6 Vakulenko (2007, 192) suggests that in 
both these cases, ‘the headscarf was attributed a highly abstract and essentialized 
meaning of a religious item extremely detrimental to gender equality’. 
Another frequently raised concern, especially in the case law, is that if 
some women or girls are allowed to wear religious clothing, those who do not 
want to wear it will be forced to do so as well. In Karaduman v Turkey and Bulut 
v Turkey, the applicants, Muslim female students, had successfully completed a 
university course, but were refused a certificate because they would not supply an 
identity photograph without a headscarf. The European Commission on Human 
Rights considered that the manifestations of a particular religion without 
restrictions ‘may constitute pressure on students who do not practise that religion 
or those who adhere to another religion’.7 In Sahin v Turkey, the ECtHR also 
                                                 
5 Dahlab v Swtizerland App. No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001, 13. 
6 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 44774/98 (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Chamber), para. 106 and (2007) 44 
EHRR 5 Grand Chamber), para. 115. 
7 Karaduman v Turkey  App. No. 16278/90 and Bulut v Turkey App. No. 18783/91, both (1993) D 
& R 74, 93, 108. 
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mentioned the impact which the wearing of the Islamic headscarf may have on 
those who choose not to wear it.8 
This pressure on others is often mentioned in relation to the ban on Islamic 
clothing or veils in schools. If some girls are allowed to wear the hijab, niqab or 
burqa, other girls will be under pressure to do so as well. Weil, a Member of the 
Stasi Commission, writes that ‘in schools where some girls are wearing the 
headscarf, the Muslim girls who do not wear it are subject to strong pressure to do 
so’ (Weil 2004, 19). He also reports that, in the increasing number of schools 
where girls wear the hijab, ‘a strong majority of Muslim girls who do not wear the 
headscarf called for the protection of the law and asked the commission to ban all 
religious exterior signs’ (ibid). This pressure can come from parents – although 
Weil mentions that some fathers took their daughters out of public schools and 
placed them in other schools where they were not under such pressure (ibid) - or 
religious leaders, but also from fundamentalist and extremist groups.  
 This pressure on others also played a role in some of the cases in Britain 
concerning schoolgirls who wanted to wear something different from the 
prescribed school uniform. Most British schools have a school uniform policy, 
which dictates what pupils should wear to school. Schools with a number of 
ethnic minority pupils often have different variants of their uniform. For example, 
                                                 
8 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 44774/98 (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Chamber), para. 106, repeated by 
the Grand Chamber (2007) 44 EHRR 5, para. 115. 
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in Begum,9 the uniform rules allowed Muslim and Sikh girls to wear a shalwar 
kameeze10 with or without a hijab in the school colours. However, Ms Begum 
wanted to wear a jilbab11 to school and the school refused to allow this exception 
to its uniform rules. The House of Lords mentioned that the school reported that, 
since Ms Begum had issued her claim, a number of Muslim girls at the school had 
said that they did not wish to wear the jilbab and that they feared they would be 
pressured into wearing it if the school allowed it. The head and her assistant and 
some parents had expressed concern that the acceptance of the jilbab as a 
permissive variant of the school uniform would lead to undesirable differentiation 
between Muslim groups according to the strictness of their views.12 Davies (2006, 
12-3) also comments on the pressure on other girls to wear the jilbab if Ms 
Begum was allowed to do so and mentions that these girls might be ‘seen as “less 
good” Muslims if they did not do so’.13 Blair (2005, 411) points out the 
repercussion of the Court of Appeal decision in Begum, which found that Ms 
                                                 
9 R (on the application of SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] 
UKHL 15 (HL). 
10 A shalwar kameeze consists of loose trousers and a smock-like dress. 
11 A jilbab is a long plain dress with sleeves covering arms and legs. 
12 R (on the application of SB) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] 
UKHL 15 (HL), para. 18. 
13 This pressure on other girls was also mentioned in the case of X, where a schoolgirl wanted to 
wear a niqab to school against the school uniform policy, see: R (on the application of X) v Head 
Teacher and Governors of Y School [2008] 1 All ER 249, para 64. 
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Begum’s freedom of religion had been infringed, and writes that ‘worryingly, 
media reports of pressure on young women to wear the jilbab, which they had 
previously been able to resist because of school uniform rules, emerged within a 
few months of the Denbigh decision’. This suggests that allowing for exceptions 
to the school uniform rules could lead to those pupils who do not wear the hijab, 
niqab, jilbab or burqa being pressured or even ostracised or singled out for 
bullying for being ‘less good’ Muslims. 
Gies (2006, 379-80) points out that the House of Lords in Begum 
expressed unease as to whether the wearing of the jilbab was truly Ms Begum’s 
own choice or if she was pressured into doing so by her brother (her father had 
died), and, whether a young girl – and possibly other young girls at her school if 
the jilbab were allowed – may have been forced into accepting a set of radical 
beliefs. Later on Gies writes that Begum raises a similar issue to the French 
headscarf bans, namely ‘the concern of state actors to protect female Muslim 
pupils from being pressured by their own community into manifesting strict 
religious beliefs against their will’ (ibid, 382). This suggests a link between the 
wearing of Islamic dress and radical beliefs. 
A related aspect to this argument of pressure on others is the possible 
influence on schoolchildren if their teachers wear religious clothing or veils. 
Teachers who wear headscarves are not seen as a good role model for children 
(Schiek 2004, 72) and the wearing of the headscarf by teachers might have some 
proselytising effect, especially on very young children, as the ECtHR pointed out 
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in Dahlab v Switzerland.14 Langlaude (2006, 931) argues that the ECtHR in this 
case expressed the opinion that ‘children need special protection, especially when 
they are at school, notably because they are entrusted to the teacher’s care. 
Accordingly, they should not be proselytized at school’. This is thus brought 
forward as a reason to ban teachers in public schools from wearing headscarves or 
other religious clothing.  
It has also been suggested, in political debates in the Netherlands for 
example, that the wearing of the hijab, niqab or burqa is an obstacle to Muslim 
women getting jobs and that unemployment benefits for burqa wearers should be 
cut, because, by wearing a burqa, a woman drastically cuts her chances of getting 
a job (Cut Benefits 2009, Dahmann 2010). Therefore, the argument goes that bans 
would help these women getting jobs.  
The conclusion from the above is that the wearing of Islamic clothing and 
face covering veils must be banned from workplaces and schools because this 
presents an obstacle to the promotion of equality between women and men, which 
is one of the fundamental values of Western (European) States and and a value to 
which everyone in those states should be committed. 
Wiles (2007, 718) sums the above up quite well where she writes that 
many feminists see the headscarf as inherently inimical to gender equality because 
it acts as a marker of women’s inferiority to men. These feminists argue, 
                                                 
14 Dahlab v Swtizerland App. No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001, 13. The children in this case were 
between 4 and 8 years old. 
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according to Wiles, that schooling is a formative environment and that girls mark 
themselves by wearing headscarves. This may inhibit their ability to form 
relationships with others and, may ultimately affect their right to education and 
their capacity to integrate into the mainstream culture in which they are living 
(Wiles 2007, 719).  
The conclusion from the above is that the wearing of Islamic headscarves 
and veils must be banned from public spaces, workplaces and schools because this 
presents an obstacle to the promotion of equality between women and men, which 
is one of the fundamental values of Western States to which everyone in those 
states should be committed 
Of course, one of the main questions in all this is whether women and girls 
are voluntarily wearing the hijab, niqab or burqa or whether they are under 
pressure from others to do so. Or, as Wiles (2007, 719-20) writes: ‘is the 
headscarf solely or invariably a symbol of female submission and inferiority in 
Islam, or is its meaning more complex and divergent, particularly in contemporary 
European societies?’ This is examined next. 
Bans are Counterproductive to the Promotion of Gender Equality  
From the above it is clear that gender equality has been used in support of 
imposing (legal) bans on the wearing of various Islamic clothing and veils. 
However, does this argument in favour of bans stand up to scrutiny? It is 
submitted that gender equality can also, and in a much more convincing way, be 
used as an argument for opposing such bans in two different, although interrelated 
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and overlapping ways. The first one looks at the meaning(s) attached to the 
wearing of the veil or headscarf for the women who wear these and how this has 
been mostly ignored in the political debates and case law. Instead, stereotypical 
ideas about Islamic veils and headscarves and the women who wear these prevail. 
The second way in which gender equality can be used to oppose bans is to 
look at the effect bans are likely to have on those women and girls who are under 
pressure to wear these garments. For them, bans could very well be 
counterproductive to their emancipation as they would act ‘to further exclude 
them from European societies’ (Freedman 2007, 29).  
In her dissenting opinion in Sahin v Turkey,15 Judge Tulkens wonders ‘what, 
in fact, is the connection between the ban and sexual equality’ and then points out 
that:  
As the German Constitutional Court noted in its judgment of 24 September 
2003,16 wearing the headscarf has no single meaning; it is a practice that is 
engaged in for a variety of reasons. It does not necessarily symbolise the 
submission of women to men and there are those who maintain that, in 
certain cases, it can even be a means of emancipating women. What is 
                                                 
15 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 44774/98 (2007) 44 EHRR 5 (Grand Chamber). 
16 Ludin v Baden-Württemberg Federal Constitutional Court, Germany (BVerfG), 24 September 
2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 NJW 56 (2003), 3111. 
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lacking in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who wear the 
headscarf and those who choose not to.17 
Judge Tulkens criticises the majority judges for linking the headscarf to the 
oppression of women and failing to question why Ms Sahin wore the headscarf. 
This clearly shows the two strands of the first argument: the link to oppression 
which is based on a stereotypical view of women who wear the headscarf; and, 
the lack of attention to what the wearing means for the individual person. It also 
refers to the second argument in that it recognises that the wearing of headscarves 
can be a means of emancipating women. Judge Tulkens comes to the conclusion 
that ‘finally, if wearing the headscarf really was contrary to the principle of 
equality between men and women in any event, the State would have a positive 
obligation to prohibit it in all places, whether public or private’.18 Each of these 
issues is discussed in the following.  
Meaning of the Headscarf 
It will be clear from the above, that the Islamic headscarf is worn for a variety of 
reasons.19 Lister et al. (2007, 94) suggest some of these where they write that the 
                                                 
17 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 44774/98 (2007) 44 EHRR 5 (Grand Chamber). dissenting 
opinion Judge Tulkens, para 11. 
18 Ibid, para 12. 
19 For the reasons why Muslim women wear the full face-veil, see, for Germany, Human Rights 
Watch (2009); for the Netherlands, Moors 2009; for France, the Report of the Open Society 
Foundations 2011; for Belgium, Brems et al. 2012; and, for Britain, Gilligan 2011.  
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headscarf ‘has become simultaneously a symbol of women’s oppression, their 
resistance to oppression and their right to cultural autonomy and religious 
freedom’. It can also be ‘in the context of Islamophobia, a form of pride and 
political resistance’ (ibid, 99). Based on research across Europe, these authors 
discuss the following reasons why Muslim women wear headscarves: a) as an 
ethnic and religious signal; b) because of pressure from family; c) as an 
affirmation of identity and a means to negotiate one’s own identity and as a sign 
of independence; and, d) as a political act or as a sign of a new and radical 
interpretation of their faith (ibid, 99-100).  Let us look at each of these in turn. 
Ethnic and religious signal 
This meaning of the wearing of the headscarf is especially associated with older 
married migrant women (Lister et al. 2007, 99; Jopke 2009, 12). According to 
Jopke (2009, 12),20 it can be found wherever there is immigration from Muslim 
countries and it exemplifies the permanent nature of the identity of origin. It can 
be seen as an expression of a sense of belonging to the country of origin and its 
principles against the new and strange society into which the woman is 
transplanted. This suggests that it is worn in order to hold on to the old and 
familiar in the face of the new geographical area and different social and cultural 
environment. This meaning is, according to Jopke (2009, 12), ‘the least 
controversial’. This meaning could also apply to women outside the group of 
older married migrant women. Killian (2003, 572), for example, writes that 
                                                 
20 Jopke bases this on Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995, 34-69).  
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women between 18 and 22 were more likely to adopt the veil as a symbol of 
difference and pride in their ethnic identity; and, that for some women, it is a way 
to reclaim an ethnic identity. And, of course, older married migrant women, like 
any other woman, could also wear the headscarf or veil because of pressure from 
their family or community.  
Pressure from family 
Both Jopke (2009, 12) and Lister et al. (2007, 99) point out that this reason to 
wear the headscarf or veil is particularly applicable to schoolgirls and college 
students, who are said to wear these garments because they are pressured by their 
parents to do so. Jopke (2009, 12) adds that this is imposed on girls by parents ‘as 
a sign of modesty and for the purpose of controlling their daughters’ sexuality’. 
Killian (2003, 572) reports on research which showed that, in France, ‘the 
majority of adolescents and preadolescents who veiled did so because of family 
pressure. Many indicated that if they did not veil, their parents would not allow 
them to attend school’. The latter can also be found in Lister et al. (2007, 99) and 
in Jopke (2009, 12), and all these authors point out that wearing a veil or 
headscarf is the only way some of these girls are being allowed to go to school or 
to take part in school excursions and sports activities.  
On the other hand, Gereluk (2008, 117-8) reports that a number of Muslim 
girls in London ‘were adamant that they had not been forced to wear the hijab’. 
They ‘felt that there was a difference between “parental guidance” and 
18 
 
“oppression”’ and that ‘their parents’ wish to have them wear the hijab was a sign 
of their guidance and love’.  
It cannot be denied that, in some cases, pressure from family or 
community elders or religious leaders is applied not only to schoolgirls and 
college students, but also to other Muslim women. However, in those cases it 
could well be that wearing a headscarf or veil is the only way these women can go 
outside the home and study or work.  
It must be noted that the above might suggest that there is a clear 
distinction between, on the one hand, wearing veils and headscarves out of choice 
and, on the other hand, doing so under direct coercion. In practice, this is often 
much more complicated and there are a number of subtle ways in which pressure 
can be exercised. This must be kept in mind, but further discussion of this goes 
beyond the scope of this article 
Affirmation of identity 
The headscarf or veil is worn by many women as an affirmation of their identity, 
as a means to negotiate their own identity and as a sign of independence.  These 
women freely choose to wear the veil or headscarf because they see it as part of 
who and what they are. For example, Bousetta and Jacobs (2006, 30) write that 
‘young Muslim women are openly claiming their right to wear it [the headscarf] 
precisely in the name of values of freedom and tolerance dear to the liberal 
democratic tradition’. These women consciously want to make a statement about 
their (religious) identity (Roseberry 2009, 341). They make this choice not 
19 
 
because they are being told to do so by men, but because they are modern, 
emancipated women who make up their own minds about what they wear and 
how they present themselves in public.  
In this sense, banning veils and headscarves can thus be seen as an 
interference with a woman’s human right to autonomy and to free choice as 
guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. As Roseberry (2009, 344) writes about using sex 
equality as justification for the banning of headscarves at work ‘rather than 
promoting sex equality, this kind of justification perpetuates sexist portrayals of 
women as being weak-willed and unable to act in their own best interests’. And 
Marshall (2006, 460) writes that ‘the position may be reached that banning means 
imposing one set of standards and denies these women freedom as autonomous 
persons in their own right: seemingly in the name of gender equality’.21 Judge 
Tulkens, in her dissenting opinion in Sahin v Turkey, expressed it as follows:  
I fail to see how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting a 
woman from following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the 
contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted … ‘Paternalism’ of this 
sort runs counter to the case-law of the Court, which has developed a real 
right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8.22 
                                                 
21 See on this also Skjeie 2007, Marshall 2008 and Mullally 2011, 38and 42..  
22 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 44774/98 (2007) 44 EHRR 5 (Grand Chamber). dissenting 
opinion Judge Tulkens, para 12. For the case law on this see the opinion. 
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It can thus be said that banning headscarves and other religious symbols is just as 
oppressive of women as forcing them to wear these. What to wear or what not to 
wear is imposed on women by, in the one case, their family or community or by, 
in the other case, the state, both without any attention for what the women 
themselves want or without any respect for their freedom and autonomy to choose 
for themselves. Or, as Van Gulik (2009), writing about headscarf bans in 
Germany and the fact that some women are indeed coerced into wearing the 
headscarf or other religious clothing, sums up rather well: 
However, our experience and research tell us that oppression cannot be 
uprooted by a state itself coercing the victims, but rather through education, 
access to justice and economic opportunity. Women’s rights are about 
autonomy. And real autonomy means freedom to make choices whether 
others like these or not. 
Political act and sign of radical interpretation of their faith 
The fourth reason why women wear the Islamic veil or headscarf is as a political 
act or as a sign of a new and radical interpretation of their faith. This could be 
seen as one or as two separate points. Some girls and women might well start 
wearing the headscarf or veil for no other reason than as a token of protest when 
the government or local authorities discuss bans in public life and in schools, 




 However, sometimes the hijab, niqab or burqa are worn as a sign of a new 
and radical interpretation of a woman’s Islamic faith. This is often the other main 
reason why bans are supported: they are seen as necessary to fight terrorism 
because the hijab, niqab and burqa are seen as symbols representative of 
extremist Muslim politics and a threat to and rejection of common liberal Western 
values. Mazher Idriss (2005, 275), writing about the cases concerning the hijab in 
France, states that these cases ‘have fuelled a fear that behind the hijab is a very 
well-organised Islamic fundamentalist network, a new “Islamic insurgency”…’. 
This shows that there are many different reasons why Muslim women wear 
headscarves and veils. The reasons discussed are interwoven and a woman might 
wear a headscarf or veil for more than one of the reasons mentioned. It is also 
clear that many people, including lawmakers and judges, make assumptions about 
why women wears these garments, often based on stereotypical ideas about 
Muslim women and without any attention being given to the opinion of the 
women themselves. These stereotypes are discussed next. 
Stereotypes 
Arguments to ban Islamic headscarves and veils are thus often based on 
stereotypes of Muslim women. The two most prevalent ones are that of the 
Muslim woman as victim – ‘the victim of a gender oppressive religion, needing 
protection from abusive, violent male relatives, and passive, unable to help herself 
in the face of a culture of male dominance’- and as aggressor – ‘the Muslim 
woman as fundamentalist who forces values onto the unwilling and undefended’ 
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(Evans 2006, 15-6). These two stereotypes are inherently contradicting each other: 
women who wear Muslim veils need rescuing from Islam, but at the same time, 
they are Islamic fundamentalists from whom everyone else needs rescuing (ibid.; 
see also: Mazher Idriss 2005, 292; Mullally 2011, 37). Evans criticises the ECtHR 
decisions in Dahlab v Switzerland and Sahin v Turkey23 for using these two 
stereotypes without recognising this inherent contradiction between them and with 
little evidence that either stereotype is accurate with respect to the applicants in 
these two cases or to Muslim women more generally (Evans 2006, 15). This 
completely ignores that, as Evans points out, the applicants in both these cases did 
not appear to be ‘stereotypically subordinate’ but were educated, intelligent and 
strong-minded individuals who wore the headscarf of their own free will and who 
were prepared to fight in domestic and international courts against what they saw 
as illegitimate regulation of their clothing (Evans 2006, 11-2).  
However, these two stereotypes are also prevalent in popular (political) 
culture as can be clearly seen in the two main arguments used for banning 
religious symbols mentioned above: bans are necessary to promote gender 
equality and to improve safety and security by fighting terrorism. The link 
between the two stereotypes ‘seems to be the idea of threat’, as Evans (2006, 16) 
writes. She continues that: 
                                                 
23 Dahlab v Swtizerland App. No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001; Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 
44774/98 (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Chamber); (2007) 44 EHRR 5 Grand Chamber). 
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The implicit threat in the woman who is too powerful, too intolerant, too 
aggressive is easy to see. But the victim is a threat too. A threat to the liberal, 
egalitarian order. A threat to control by the state and secular authorities 
because their coercion is less effective than that of the family and the 
subculture. In response the state increases its coercion and control (ibid. 16-
7).  
It is submitted that it is this threat, the threat of political Islam, which lies behind 
many bans and proposed bans on Muslim headscarves and face coverings. The 
ECtHR decision in Sahin v Turkey24  shows, as Skjeie (2007, 1330) writes, that 
the court is strongly influenced by it’s ‘general ambition to curb political Islam’, 
while Rorive remarks that the Court’s decision ‘seems to be driven by the fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism’ (Rorive 2009, 2684) and relies on ‘populist images’ 
which are ‘already deeply entrenched in the political debate in many European 
States’ (ibid, 2685). Pimor (2006, 333) also writes that, in both Dahlab v 
Switzerland and Sahin v Turkey, 25 ‘rather than focusing on the Muslim 
applicants’ actual freedom to manifest their religion, national and European 
authorities diverted the dialogue towards political considerations’. Pimor sums 
this up well were she writes:  
                                                 
24 Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 44774/98 (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Chamber); (2007) 44 EHRR 5 
Grand Chamber). 
25 Dahlab v Swtizerland App. No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001; Leyla Sahin v Turkey App. No. 
44774/98 (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (Chamber); (2007) 44 EHRR 5 Grand Chamber). 
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The emerging pattern seems to show that Strasbourg does not necessarily 
deal with the protection of Muslim women’s individual rights per se, but 
instead endeavours to tackle the polemical and political angle of Islam, the 
result of which is an attempt to possibly subdue religious expressions of the 
Muslim faith in order to render Islam more acceptable in Europe, by making 
it less visible and therefore less threatening to western and secular values 
(ibid). 
This threat is thus of the political discourse across Europe. Islam is identified as 
the enemy in our midst and one of the strategies to deal with this is ‘an assault on 
[Islamic] dress forms, which is legitimated by ensuring that observers’ 
stereotypical interpretation of these forms of dress, seen as representing either 
subjugation or strident militancy, take precedence over the wearer’s definitions’ 
(Edwards 2010,  127).  
 Therefore, women wear Muslim veils and headscarves for a variety of 
reasons but these are often ignored in political debates and in court cases where 
stereotypical ideas about these veils and headscarves and the women who wear 
them are used to make decisions. Consultation with women who have chosen to 
wear these or who have explicitly chosen not to wear these is notably absent in all 
this.  
The argument that bans on these forms of clothing are necessary to 
promote gender equality is based on one of the prevalent stereotypes, that all 
Muslim women who wear these garments are forced to do so and thus need 
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emancipating. But does a woman who freely chooses to wear, or not to wear, a 
headscarf or veil, need emancipating? This brings us to the second argument. 
Counterproductive 
The other main counter-argument, linked to the above, is that bans on the wearing 
of Islamic clothing are not only not necessary for the promotion of equality 
between men and women, but that they can even be counterproductive and hinder 
the emancipation of Muslim women and girls. Of course, women and girls should 
not be, either openly or more subtly, pressured into wearing what they do not want 
to wear or be prohibited from wearing what they freely choose to wear. But, in the 
cases where women are forced to wear Muslim headscarves and veils, would bans 
stop this pressure? It is submitted that, on the contrary, bans could very well 
increase sex inequality since, as mentioned above, bans might prevent women and 
girls from going out, getting an (university) education or entering a workplace and 
this would marginalise these women in society and could very well take away 
their chances of (economic) independence (Marshall 2006, 460; Roseberry 2009, 
343-4 and 347; Sacksofsky 2009, 361). Getting an education and a job is often the 
way towards gaining more equality with men and for the women and girls who are 
pressured into wearing these items, this path to emancipation might very well be 
cut off by bans, because then they are not allowed to go out at all. As Mahlmann 
(2003, 1111) argues, ‘it seems to be a rather surprising strategy to foster the 
emancipation of Muslim women by blocking their professional careers’.  
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Therefore, the wearing of the headscarf or veil can itself be seen as a way of 
emancipating women, of giving them a chance to gain equality in and through 
work and education. Van Gulik (2009) writes that ‘banning the headscarf is the 
worst possible response to the need to bring people into mainstream society. Our 
research26 showed that the ban serves to exclude, rather than include’. She also 
reports that ‘all of the women we spoke to told us they had freely chosen to wear 
it. But the bans do them harm, leaving them unable to work in the jobs they had 
chosen, and causing them to lose financial independence’ (ibid.). Muslim women 
themselves thus often see the wearing of headscarves as ‘a way to break free from 
the sexual market place to participate in public life and escape the scrutiny of 
fathers and brothers’ (Mouritsen 2006, 86).  
Banning the wearing of headscarves and veils would thus be 
counterproductive, as it would prevent these garments playing this emancipatory 
role. Or, as Schiek (2004, 72) writes, ‘a headscarf ban would in fact hinder steps 
towards emancipation by Muslim women, who are not (yet) prepared to adapt to 
Western ideals of equality, and thus not allow them to integrate into public life’. 
And, bans on the wearing of headscarves and veils in schools could very well lead 
to girls being withdrawn from education altogether and even to them being sent 
away and married off at an early age. Bans could thus negatively affect equal 
access to education and jobs for a number of women. As the research by Killian 
                                                 
26 For this research see: Human Rights Watch (2009).  
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(2009, 572), reported on above, showed, many French schoolgirls indicated that if 
they did not veil, their parents would not allow them to attend school. 
As mentioned, bans on the wearing of headscarves by teachers are also 
supported by the argument that this could influence their pupils or put pressure on 
them in some way. Naturally, teachers are not permitted to indoctrinate children 
and there is ‘no room for missionaries in public schools’, but ‘just wearing the 
headscarf does not constitute such a missionary impetus’, as Sacksofsky (2009, 
361-2) rightly points out. She continues that seeing some teachers with 
headscarves and some without could teach children about diversity and tolerance. 
Besides teaching about tolerance and diversity, a teacher wearing a 
headscarf could also be a very positive role model for pupils. As Schiek (2004, 
72) points out, ‘a Muslim woman achieving a career as a teacher and earning her 
own living could just as well serve as a role model to her Muslim girl pupils, 
especially when such pupils are confronted by parental demands not to attend 
further education’. 
Therefore, seeing teachers wearing Muslim headscarves could, in fact, have 
a very positive effect on both younger and older pupils. Moreover, the influence 
on children of teachers wearing a headscarf might not be all that great because 
many children will not experience a headscarf as something out of the ordinary or 
special, as they see them regularly outside school in all kinds of places. For many 




It is submitted that it is far too simple to say that gender equality requires that the 
wearing of Islamic headscarves and veils is banned. This argument is based on the 
view that Muslim women are wearing headscarves or veils because they are being 
pressured into doing so by men. Islam is thus seen as a patriarchal and 
paternalistic religion which does not espouse gender equality and which imposes a 
certain way of dress on women. Therefore, the argument goes, Muslim women 
wearing these garments must be liberated from the dictates of men and protected 
against the pressures put upon them and this needs to be done by banning the 
wearing of Muslim headscarves and veils. However, this is based on the 
stereotype of Muslim women as victims of oppression and ignores a number of 
issues. 
First of all, it ignores the fact that banning the wearing of headscarves and 
veils by the state is just as paternalistic and patriarchal as putting pressure on 
women to wear these garments. Both prescribe what women should wear and do 
not pay any attention to what the woman in question herself wants to wear. It 
completely ignores a woman’s human right to autonomy and to free choice as 
guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. As Lyon and Spini write (2004, 341), ‘the answer 
to one constraint (the religious obligation to wear the foulard [headscarf]) cannot 
be another constraint (the obligation not to wear it): an effective process of 
liberation cannot be based on a prohibition [their emphasis]’. 
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 Secondly, it presumes that women wearing headscarves and veils are 
oppressed without much evidence that this is indeed the case. Gereluk (2008, 118) 
writes that ‘it is not enough to suggest that individuals may be oppressed by 
certain clothing, one needs to show supporting evidence to make the case’. 
 This leads to the third issue which is ignored in this argument. This is that 
many women wear the headscarf out of their own free choice and for a multitude 
of reasons, some of which have been discussed above. If a woman wears a 
headscarf or veil out of her own free choice, which she has made as an 
autonomous person who is well able to make up her own mind, does she then 
need liberating?  
Of course, there are women and girls who wear headscarves and veils 
because of pressure by their family or religious community and this can be seen as 
paternalistic and as going against the idea of equality between men and women. In 
this case, the woman or girl in question can be said to be oppressed and needs 
liberating from this oppression, but is a ban on the wearing of these garments 
going to help this woman or girl? It is this group that is likely to suffer more from 
bans. As they are oppressed, they will be banned from attending schools and 
universities and going out to work, thus aggravating the situation because they 
might loose any chance of getting an education or a job. Bans might thus have the 
opposite effect of what they are trying to achieve for this group: they might 
restrict their chances of being liberated or emancipated by further isolating these 
women and girls and by stopping them from taking any part in society at all.  
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It is therefore submitted that the gender equality argument for banning 
headscarves and veils is false and that the women such bans are alleged to liberate 
are just those people who may well suffer the most from a ban. Without a ban, 
they could gain more emancipation through education and work. Or, as Evans 
(2006, 13) concludes, ‘the reality [of banning religious clothing] is that some 
women will no longer be able to pursue their education or their careers in public 
places. If a feminist analysis is to be undertaken, the harm done to these women 
must be taken into account’. The answer to the question posed in the title of this 
article, whether gender equality is a valid argument for the banning of Islamic 
veils must thus be a resounding ‘no’. 
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